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ABSTRACT
We study the effects of public investment in a dynamic overlapping-generations model of a small
open economy. Boosting public investment stimulates private capital formation, output,
employment, and wages in the long run. The impact effects depend critically on whether public
capital is modeled as a stock or as a flow. The welfare benefits are unevenly distributed across
generations since capital ownership, and the capital gain induced by the policy shock, rises with
age, and because wages rise only gradually under the stock interpretation of public capital. A
suitable egalitarian bond policy can be employed to ensure that everybody gains to the same
extent. With this additional instrument the intergenerational externality can be neutralized and the
resulting efficiency gain coincides with the one obtained in the corresponding representative agent
model. A simple modified golden rule for public investment is derived which takes into account
the time that is needed to build the public capital stock.
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Macroeconomists have long felt that public investment is an important factor in enhancing the
productive capacity of the economy. Yet, for a long time, it only played a very modest role in the
literature. Recently this has changed quite drastically, however. The empirical research by
Aschauer (1989, 1990) triggered a boom in the literature on public investment. Aschauer’s results
suggested that it had a strong positive effect on the productivity of private capital and that the
slowdown in productivity growth in the United States since the early 1970s was due to a shortage
in public infrastructure. These controversial results generated a substantial body of research
directed at determining whether public investment had in fact been too low.
1 However, this
question cannot be answered without a clear picture of the macroeconomic effects and the welfare
effects of public investment. This paper is aimed to clarify this image.
In many cases it is the accumulated stock of public capital rather than the flow of public
investment that is relevant for the productive capacity of the economy. Current decisions on public
investment made by short-lived individuals therefore have long-lasting effects and thus influence
the welfare of both present and future generations, i.e. there is both an intratemporal and an
intertemporal external effect at work. Public investment policy thus must pay attention to both the
efficiency question of ‘how much to invest’ and the distributional question of ‘who pays for the
public capital stock and how much.’ Unfortunately, in much of the existing literature the flow of
public investment rather than the stock of public capital is modeled as the source of contribution to
productive capacity.
2 Moreover, attention has been unduly focused on only the efficiency effect of
public investment. It is this void in the image of the effects of public investment that this paper is
aimed to clarify.
Most theoretical papers on the productivity of public investment use a Ramsey framework
with an infinitely-lived representative household.
3 In this type of models the optimal long-run level
of public investment can easily be defined. This optimal level is derived either in a command
economy (first best solution) or in a market economy where the government has a limited set of
instruments to finance its expenditures and to correct external effects (second best solution). Some
papers also study the transition from an initial state to this long-run optimum, either numerically
(e.g. Baxter and King (1993)) or analytically (as in Fisher and Turnovsky (1996)). However, by
assuming a Ramsey framework these papers do not allow for intergenerational redistribution
effects. Indeed, to the extent that this fictional agent really constitutes a shortcut description of a
dynasty of finitely-lived and altruistically linked generations, there is really no intergenerational
external effect to worry about. By definition, altruistically linked generations view future
generations as continuations of themselves, and therefore internalize intergenerational external
-1-effects. In contrast to the Ramsey-framework, overlapping generations models, such as developed
by Diamond (1965), Yaari (1965), and Blanchard (1985), allow for a simple demographic structure
in which unlinked generations co-exist at any moment in time. In the Yaari-Blanchard formulation,
agents face a constant exogenous probability of death and are unconnected to previous generations
due to the absence of a bequest motive. Overlapping generations models of this type form a
suitable framework to study the intergenerational effects of public investment.
In this paper both the efficiency and the intergenerational welfare effects of public
investment are studied. To this end the small open economy version of the Yaari-Blanchard model
is extended to include the productive effect of public investment. The model describes an economy
that, apart from the foreign sector, consists of three sectors. Firstly, a household sector which
comprises a large number of cohorts which differ with respect to age and thus the level and
composition of their wealth. Labour is included in the utility function of the households along the
lines set out by Greenwood et al. (1988) which implies that public investment affects labour supply
through changes in the wage rate. Secondly, the model contains a perfectly competitive production
sector with a standard adjustment cost function in order to guarantee smooth transition. And finally
there is a government which invests in public capital. The model is flexible in the sense that both
the stock and the flow interpretation of public capital can analyzed with it.
This paper is most closely related to the recent work of Fisher and Turnovsky (1996) who
analyze the impact of the stock of public capital on macroeconomic performance. Their paper
differs from ours at a number of points, however. In contrast to this paper, they allow for
congestion. Congestion introduces an additional externality in the model, which is important if one
wants to analyze the effects of different tax instruments to finance public investment, as they do.
That is not the subject of this paper however. We restrict ourselves to lump sum taxes and
government debt as the only sources for financing public investment. Our main contribution to the
literature is that we use an overlapping generations model and analyze both efficiency and
redistribution, whereas Fisher and Turnovsky concentrate on efficiency aspects in a Ramsey
framework. Another important difference is that we assume a small open economy with
endogenous labour supply instead of a closed economy facing an exogenously given supply of
labour as they do. We regard this as a useful contribution to the literature because it is difficult to
pin-point any truly closed economies in the global market at present. Moreover, the exogeneity of
the interest rate substantially simplifies the analysis. This enables us to make another important
contribution to the literature, namely the derivation of a simple ‘modified golden rule’ of public
investment in a dynamic economy. This rule elegantly demonstrates the crucial interaction between
the productivity of public capital, the degree of durability of public capital and the world interest
-2-rate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the overlapping
generations model with public investment. It also describes the steady state of the model and its
dynamic behaviour around an initial steady state. The macroeconomic effects of public investment
are investigated in Section 3. This section describes the effect of an unanticipated permanent
increase in public investment when no debt policy is used and the tax revenue needed to finance
the government’s investment plans is raised through an age-independent lump sum tax. Analytical
expression for the impact, transitional, and long-run effects of the policy shock on the various
macroeconomic variables are derived.
In Section 4 the intergenerational welfare effects of public investment are analyzed. This is
done first for the case without debt policy. It is shown that, if we concentrate on the effects on
utility of generations born in the steady state, the traditional ‘golden rule’ applies: utility is
maximized if the share of public investment equals the elasticity of production with respect to
public capital. However, this does not automatically imply that, if public investment is below this
level, it should or will be raised. The reason for this is that the welfare effects of a boost in public
investment are distributed very unevenly over generations. The welfare of very old generations,
that possess a large amount of financial assets, will always rise due to the capital gain on their
financial wealth. The effect on the welfare of younger existing generations may also be positive.
This will be the case if human wealth increases on impact, that is, if the share of public investment
is far below its ‘golden-rule’ level and the birth rate is not too high. In that case selfish current
generations will vote in favour of a proposal to (marginally) increase public investment. If the level
of public investment is larger, but still below the ‘golden-rule’ level, the welfare of younger
existing generations will fall if the government increases investment. The reason for this is that
these generations have no or little financial assets and thus do not capture a large capital gain,
while they do not yet benefit from higher wages because it takes time for the public and the
private capital stock to adjust. In that case, a supposedly ‘efficiency improving’ proposal to
increase public investment may not be accepted in a vote. This finding demonstrates the need for a
mechanism aimed at equalizing the distribution of welfare over generations. We show that a bond
policy in combination with a once-off tax on capital owners can be used to neutralize the
intergenerational welfare effects. This leads to a more ambitious stance regarding public
investment. It does not lead to realization of the ‘golden-rule’ level of public investment, however.
In fact, internalizing the intergenerational external effect brings the ‘pure efficiency effects’ of
public investments to the fore. This leads to the ‘modified golden rule’ of public investment that
was mentioned above. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks and directions for
-3-further research.
2. A model of perpetual youth and public capital
2.1. Households
The utility functional at time t of the representative agent born at time v is denoted by L(v,t) and
has the following form:
where a is the pure rate of time preference (a>0), b is the probability of death (b³0), and X(v,t)i s




logX(v,t) exp (a b)(t t)d t ,
sub-utility or full consumption' which depends on labour supply, L(v,t), and goods consumption,
C(v,t), respectively:
with sL>0. Equation (2.2) was suggested by Greenwood et al. (1988) and is useful because it




eliminates the intertemporal substitution effect in labour supply.
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The agent’s budget restriction in terms of the world price of the good is equal to:
where A ˙(t)ºdA(v,t)/dt, r(t) is the real rate of interest on government bonds, W(t) is the real wage
(2.3) ˙ A(v,t) r(t) b A(v,t) W(t)L(v,t) T(t) C(v,t),
rate (assumed age-independent for convenience), T(t) are net lump-sum taxes, and A(v,t) are real
tangible assets. All tangible assets are perfect substitutes:
where V(v,t) is the real value of shares in the hands of households of vintage v, B(v,t) is real
(2.4) A(v,t) º B(v,t) V(v,t) F(v,t),
government bonds, and F(v,t) denotes real net foreign assets. The domestic economy is small in
world capital markets, so that the world real rate of interest r is fixed. In the absence of terms-of-
trade effects, the domestic real interest rate is then determined by the familiar no-arbitrage
condition:
Due to the separable structure of preferences, the choice problem for the representative
(2.5) r(t) r.
agent can be solved in two steps. First, the dynamic problem is solved. This leads to an optimal
-4-time profile for full consumption which is described by the agent’s Euler equation:

















1 sL, L(v,t) W(t)
sL.
simple demographic structure, which enables the aggregation over all currently alive households.
Assuming that at each instance a large cohort of size bS is born and that bS agents die, and
normalising S to unity, the size of the population is constant and equal to unity and the aggregated
variables can be calculated as the weighted sum of the values for the different generations. For
example, aggregate financial wealth is calculated as A(t)ºò-
t
¥bA(v,t)e
b(v-t)dv. The aggregated values
for the other variables can be obtained in the same fashion. The main equations describing the
behaviour of the aggregated household sector are:
plus the expressions for labour supply and aggregate consumption given in equations (T1.6) and
(2.8) ˙ X(t)
X(t)



















(T1.10) in Table 1, respectively. In equation (2.8), A(t)ºV(t)+F(t)+B(t) represents aggregate
financial wealth. Throughout the paper we analyze the case in which initially both the government
debt and the stock of foreign assets are zero, i.e. B=F=0 initially. This not only ensures that the
trade balance is zero in the initial steady state (see (2.12) below) but also that the capital stock is
fully owned by domestic households and that financial wealth is strictly positive, i.e. A=V>0
initially. The expression in (2.8) shows that this is consistent with a steady state provided the
world interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference, i.e. r>a (see (2.6)). The rising full
consumption profile that this implies ensures that financial wealth is transferred from old to young
generations in the steady state (see Blanchard, 1985). Note that labour supply in (T1.6) only
depends on the real wage rate.
2.2. Firms
The representative perfectly competitive firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function, reported in
(T1.8), which is linearly homogenous in the two private production factors, private capital (K(t))
and labour (L(t)), where Y(t) is gross output, KG(t) is the stock of public capital, and the
-5-parameters satisfy 0£h<eL<1. The restriction h<eL ensures diminishing returns to broadly defined
capital and thus excludes the possibility of endogenous growth in the model.
The firm faces convex adjustment costs defined on gross investment. We follow Uzawa
(1969) by postulating an installation cost function F(.) which links gross to net capital
accumulation. See equation (T1.3), where I(t) is gross investment and d is the depreciation rate.
The firm maximizes the present value of its cash flow,





Y(t) W(t)L(t) I(t) e
r(t t)dt,
optimality conditions yield expressions for labour demand in (T1.5), investment demand (T1.7),
and the shadow value of installed capital (viz. Tobin’s q) in (T1.4). Since the installation cost
function, F(.), is homogeneous of degree zero in I(t) and K(t) and the production technology is
linear-homogeneous in private factors of production, Tobin’s marginal and average q coincide, and
the stock market value of the firm equals V(t)=q(t)K(t) (see Hayashi (1982) and Heijdra and
Meijdam (1997)).
2.3. The government and the foreign sector
The periodic budget identity of the government is:
where T(t) is the real lump-sum tax levied on the households and IG(t) is gross public investment.
(2.10) ˙ B(t) rB(t) IG(t) T(t),
The stock of public capital evolves according to the expression in (T1.13), where dG represents the
rate of depreciation of the stock of public capital. If dG®¥, public capital evaporates
instantaneously and the flow of government investment enters the private production function as in
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). Since the government is expected to remain solvent, the following
NPG condition is relevant:






The trade balance is the difference between domestic production and absorption:
-6-The current account is then computed by using the time derivative of (T1.12) and simplifying:
(2.12) TB(t) º Y(t) C(t) IG(t) I(t).
(2.13) ˙ F(t) rF(t) TB(t).
2.4. Equilibrium and stability
The complete dynamic model is given in aggregated form in Table 1. The dynamic part of the
model is given by equations (T1.1)-(T1.4). Equation (T1.1) is obtained by using (2.7) in (2.3),
aggregating over all generations, and noting that full consumption is proportional to total wealth,
i.e. X(t)=(a+b)[A(t)+H(t)], where H(t) is human wealth. Equation (T1.2) shows the time path for
human wealth, where full income, YF(t), represents the dividend payment' on human wealth,
which equals after-tax labour income minus the utility cost of supplying the optimal amount of
labour. Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) show that YF(t) can be written as in (T1.9). Equations (T1.1)-
(T1.2) represent the saving system of the model, whilst (T1.3)-(T1.4) represent the investment
system (See also Bovenberg (1993, 1994) for this use of terminology in a similar model).
The static part of the model is given in equations (T1.5)-(T1.10). Labour demand and
supply are given in (T1.5) and (T1.6), respectively, (T1.7) is investment demand, and (T1.8) is the
aggregate production function. Goods consumption and full consumption are reported in (T1.10).
Finally, equation (T1.11) is the intertemporal government budget restriction, (T1.12) is the
definition of financial wealth, and (T1.13) shows the evolution of the stock of public capital.
In order to study the dynamical properties of the model, it is first log-linearized around an
initial steady state. The main expressions are found in Table 2. A tilde ( ~') above a variable
denotes its rate of change around the initial steady-state, e.g., x ˜(t)ºdx(t)/x. A variable with a tilde
and a dot is the time derivative expressed in terms of the initial steady-state, for example,
x ˜
.
(t)ºx ˙(t)/x. The only exceptions to that convention refer to the various wealth components, full
income, and lump-sum taxes, i.e. x ˜(t)ºrdx(t)/Y and x ˜
.
(t)ºrx ˙(t)/Y for xÎ(A,H,B,F), T ˜(t)º dT(t)/Y, and
Y ˜
F(t)º dYF(t)/Y.
In order to solve the model, it is useful to first condense the static part of the model as
much as possible. By using (T2.5), (T2.6), and (T2.8), we obtain quasi-reduced form' expressions
for output (Y ˜(t)), employment (L ˜(t)), and the real wage (W ˜(t)) in terms of the private and public
capital stocks (K ˜(t) and K ˜
G(t)):












˜ L(t) (1 sL) ˜ W(t)
(1 sL)(1 eL) ˜ K(t) h(1 sL) ˜ KG(t)
1 sL(1 eL)
.
increases both the wage, equilibrium employment, and output. If sL=0, labour supply is exogenous
and the employment effect vanishes.
The investment system can be summarized by using (2.14) and (T2.7) in (T2.3)-(T2.4) and
writing the resulting expressions in a single matrix form:





























































wA 1 sL(1 eL)
˜ KG(t),
following matrix form:
















































system is stable provided the share of government spending is not too high. Proposition 1
summarizes the results that have been derived for the model.
PROPOSITION 1: Let eL/(1+sL)>wG>0. The loglinearized model of Table 2 implies the following
results: (i) The full model is locally saddle-point stable; (ii) The characteristic roots of the
investment system are distinct and satisfy -hI<0 and rI>r; (iii) the stable root satisfies ¶hI/¶sA<0
and hI®¥ as sA®0; (iv) The characteristic roots of the saving system are distinct and satisfy
rS=r+b and -hS=r-(a+b)<0; (v) the stable root satisfies ¶hS/¶b>0 and hS®¥ as b®¥.P ROOF: See
Appendix.
-8-3. The macroeconomic effects of public investment
In this section we study the allocation effects of an unanticipated and permanent increase in the
level of public investment. The time at which the policy shock occurs is normalized to zero (hence,
I ˜
G>0 for t³0). We assume throughout this section that no debt policy is used and that the tax
revenue needed to finance the government’s investment plans is raised in a lump-sum fashion from
households. This implies that the loglinearized version of the government budget restriction (T1.11)
reduces to T ˜(t)=wGI ˜
G.
3.1. The investment system
In order to explain the intuition behind the results, we use the diagrammatic apparatus of Figure 1,
which is the graphical representation of the investment system given in (2.15). The K ˙(t)=0 locus
represents (q,K)-combinations for which the capital stock is in equilibrium, i.e. for which net
investment is zero. It is horizontal and q
* represents the unique value for Tobin’s q for which
F(.)=d (see (T1.7) and (T1.3)). For values of q(t) larger (smaller) than q
*, net investment is
positive (negative) as is shown with horizontal arrows in Figure 1.
The q ˙(t)=0 locus represents (q,K)-combinations for which Tobin’s q is constant over time.
It is downward sloping because a higher capital stock leads to fall in the marginal product of
capital and thus to a lower dividend to the owners of shares. For points to the right (left) of the
line the marginal product of capital is too low (high) so that part of the return on shares is
explained by capital gains (losses). Hence, q ˙(t)>0 (<0) to the right (left) of the line, as has been
shown with vertical arrows in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, in view of the discussion in section 2.4,
the arrow configuration in Figure 1 confirms that the equilibrium at E0 is saddle point stable.
The increase in public investment ultimately leads to a permanently higher stock of public
capital (see (T1.13) or, equivalently, (T2.13)). This explains why the q ˙(t)=0 locus shifts to the right
in the long run, so that the new steady state is at point E1 in Figure 1. In the long run, there is no
effect on Tobin’s q so that the increase in the marginal product of private capital caused by the
increase in public capital is exactly offset by an increase in the private capital stock:
By using (3.1) and (2.14), the long-run results on output, employment, and the real wage are











˜ KG(¥), ˜ KG(¥) ˜ IG>0.
obtained:























˜ IG >0 .
on a stable trajectory leading to the steady-state equilibrium at E1 in combination with the fact that
the private capital stock is predetermined (K ˜(0)=0). It is shown in Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) that
Tobin’s q and thus private investment rises unambiguously as a result of the boost in public
investment:
Public investment thus causes a boom in private investment.
(3.3) ˜ q(0) sA˜ I(0)
rh(1 sL)(wA wI)dG˜ IG
wArI(rI dG)1 sL(1 eL)
>0 .
If the depreciation rate of public capital is finite (0<dG ¥), the public capital stock is
predetermined in which case equation (2.14) implies that output, employment and the real wages
are all unaffected at impact:
The investment boom gives rise to a gradual increase in the private capital stock which in turn
(3.4) ˜ Y(0) ˜ L(0) ˜ W(0) 0, (for 0<dG ¥).
affects the marginal product of capital during transition and thus also Tobin’s q. The transition
paths for capital and Tobin’s q are:
where T(hI,dG,t) is a bell-shaped transition term, which is zero at impact and in the long run and













(3.6) ˜ q(t) e
hIt˜ q(0) rI˜ q(0)T(hI,dG,t),
positive during transition.
5 The second term on the right-hand sides of (3.5) and (3.6) represents
the transitory effect of the public investment shock on the private capital stock and Tobin’s q,
respectively.
Under the stock interpretation of public investment, there are important anticipation effects
despite the fact that the policy shock itself is unanticipated. This is because individual investors are
aware of the accumulation identity (T1.13) and thus know that the stock of public capital will rise
over time. This explains why Tobin’s q follows an upward sloping time profile immediately after
-10-the public investment shock takes place. Indeed, by differentiating (3.6) with respect to time, we
obtain:




(0) r˜ q(0) > 0, (for 0<dG ¥).
the saddle path is upward sloping in point A. In Figure 1 the transition path is represented by the
dashed line from A to the new equilibrium at E1.
The impact and transition effects are somewhat different if a flow concept of public capital
is used, as in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). In our model this case is obtained by letting dG®¥
which (by (T2.13)) implies that K ˜
G(t)=I ˜
G for all t³0. The impact effect for Tobin’s q is obtained
from (3.3) by letting dG®¥. In contrast to the earlier case, output, employment, and the real wage
rise at impact,












˜ L(0) (1 sL) ˜ W(0)
h(1 sL)˜ IG
1 sL(1 eL)
> 0, (for dG®¥).





rh(1 sL)(wA wI)(rI r)˜ IG
wA 1 sL(1 eL) rI
< 0, (for dG®¥),
impact from point E0 to point A¢ directly above it, and the saddle path is downward sloping in that
point. There are no anticipation effects and Tobin’s q returns smoothly and monotonically towards
its equilibrium value. In Figure 1 this is represented by the broken line from A¢ to the new
equilibrium at E1. As is apparent from Figure 1, the adjustment path for the private capital stock is
monotonic regardless of the magnitude of dG. Indeed, by differentiating (3.5) with respect to time,
we obtain:





























We have thus demonstrated that the effects of productivity enhancing government spending
depend in a crucial way on the nature of these public outlays. The prototypical examples of public
investment concern infrastructural projects such as roads, bridges, railway tracks, harbours, airports,
-11-etcetera, for which the stock interpretation is the most appropriate one. For this reason attention in
the rest of the paper will be focused on the stock interpretation, for which 0<dG ¥. On occasion
the results under the flow interpretation will be referred to.
Given the transition path for the capital stock (3.5), the paths for employment, wages and
output follow directly from (2.14) above, so that the transition patterns of these respective variables
all display the same pattern as the private capital stock, viz. there is a zero impact effect followed
by a gradual monotonic increase to a new steady state. Accumulation of private and public capital
increases the marginal product of labour, shifts labour demand outward and results in higher wages
and employment. Output rises both because of the increased capital stocks and the induced boost in
employment.
3.2. The saving system
The shock affecting the saving system is time-varying and fully determined by the time path of full
income. Since the path of wages rises monotonically (see above), and the lump-sum tax exhibits a
once-off rise at impact, the time path of full income is also monotonically increasing. At impact
full income falls because of the increase in the lump-sum tax:
The long-run effect on full income can be computed by using (3.2) in (T2.9) and noting that
(3.11) ˜ YF(0) ˜ T(0) wG˜ IG <0 .
T ˜ ( t )=wGI ˜
G:
The long-run effect on full income is determined by the interplay of two separate influences. On
(3.12) ˜ YF(¥) eL ˜ W(¥) ˜ T(¥) (h wG)˜ IG
>
<
0, ˜ YF(¥)>˜ Y F(0).
the one hand an increase in public investment raises the marginal product of labour and thus
increases the wage and, since labour supply is upward sloping, gross labour income. This is
represented by the positive term involving h on the right-hand side of (3.12). On the other hand,
the additional public investment leads to higher lump-sum taxes which causes a reduction of full
income. On balance, if h>wG (=,<) the gross labour-income effect dominates (equals, is dominated
by) the tax effect, so that full income rises (stays the same, falls) in the long run. By invoking the
steady state in (2.16) and substituting (3.12), the long-run effects on human and financial wealth
and full consumption are obtained:













shows that full consumption equilibrium implies a unique (X/A)-ratio which only depends on the
exogenous interest rate and taste parameters. But since full consumption is proportional to total
wealth, this automatically implies that the (X/H)- and (A/H)-ratios are also constant in the steady
state.
We now turn to the impact effects and the transitional dynamics implied by the saving
system. As was demonstrated in section 2.4 above, the saving system is saddle point stable, with
financial assets (net of capital gains or losses) acting as the predetermined variable and human
wealth as the jumping variable. The initial condition for the saving system is provided by the
requirement that at impact the jump in financial assets is equal to the capital gain enjoyed by
shareholders due to the increase in Tobin’s q. By using (3.3) and (T2.12) and noting that K ˜(0)=
F ˜(0)=B ˜(0)=0 this implies:
It is shown in Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) that the jump in the value of human wealth which
(3.14) ˜ A(0) wA˜ q(0) > 0.
takes place at impact is proportional to the present value of full income, using the unstable root of
the saving system (rSºr+b) as the discount factor:
where {Y ˜
F,s} denotes the Laplace transformation of the time path of Y ˜
F(t) using the discount





(r b)tdt º r {˜ YF,r b}.
factor s. The impact effect on human wealth thus depends on the entire path of full income and its
sign is ambiguous. The downward jump of full income at impact (Y ˜
F(0)<0) gives it a negative
impulse which may or may not be offset by the long-run effect on full income. The following
observations clarify what is going on. First, if public capital is relatively abundant (wG³h), then
Y ˜
F(¥)£0 (see (3.12)) and human wealth must fall at impact, i.e. H ˜(0)<0 in that case. Second, if
public capital is relatively scarce (h<wG), then Y ˜
F(¥)>0 and the sign of the impact effect on human
wealth depends critically on the magnitude of the turnover rate of the population (b) relative to the
adjustment speed of the investment system (hI). If the turnover rate is low or physical capital is
highly mobile, b/hI is low and the impact effect on human wealth is dominated by the long-run
effect on full income and thus tends to be positive. Intuitively, full income rises rapidly to its
higher level, and agents live long enough to enjoy this. Conversely, if b/hI is high, the impact
-13-effect on human wealth is dominated by the impact effect on full income and thus tends to be
negative.
7
The time profile of real financial assets may be non-monotonic due to intergenerational
distributional effects, and depends on the transition speeds of both the investment system (hI) and
the saving system (hS). Since we shall have no need to refer to the time path of financial assets, we
pay no further attention to it in the interest of brevity. Proposition 2 summarizes the most
important macroeconomic effects of the policy shock that have been discussed in this section.
PROPOSITION 2: Let 0<dG ¥. Then (i) at impact Tobin’s q, financial assets, and private investment
rise; (ii) human wealth falls at impact if public capital is relatively scarce and the birth rate is
relatively low; (iii) in the long run, the private capital stock, output, wages, and employment rise,
and Tobin’s q is unchanged; (iv) Full income, human wealth, and financial wealth rise (stay the
same, fall) if wG<(=,>)h; (v) the transition paths for private capital, wages, output, employment,
full income, and human wealth are monotonically increasing; (vi) the transition path for Tobin’s q
is non-monotonic. PROOF: See text.
4. The welfare effects of public investment
In order to evaluate the welfare effects during transition, we must take into account that different
generations are affected differently by the public investment shock. Indeed, it was shown in the
previous section that owners of the private capital stock enjoy a capital gain on their shares as a
result of the shock (see (3.3) and (3.14)) whilst human wealth may fall at impact if public capital
is already relatively abundant or if the birth rate is relatively low (see the discussion below (3.15)).
Since the old existing generations are the owners of the capital stock and young existing
generations rely mostly on human wealth, it is to be expected that the welfare effects are
distributed unevenly across existing generations. The same holds for future generations. Because
there exists a considerable amount of transitional dynamics in the model, as both private and public
capital accumulate only gradually, generations born at different dates in the future will generally be
affected differently by the investment shock. By using the Laplace transform techniques pioneered
by Judd (1982) and Bovenberg (1993, 1994), it is nevertheless possible to evaluate the entire
welfare profile across time (for future generations) and across ages (for generations alive at the
time of the shock).
-14-4.1. Intergenerational welfare effects without bond policy
To bring out the issues most clearly, we first study the case where no debt policy is used. The
welfare effect on generations that exist at the time of the shock (t=0) is denoted by dL(v,0), with
v£0. It is shown in Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) that this effect can be written as follows:
for v£0, where wHºrH/Y, wAºrA/Y, and X ˜(v,0)ºdX(v,0)/X(v,0) is the jump at impact in the level of
(4.1) (a b)dL(v,0) ˜ X(v,0) ˜ A(0)/wA 1 e
(r a)v ˜ H(0)/wH e
(r a)v,
full consumption by a household of generation v. Note that dL(v,0) in (4.1) can be also be written
as a weighted average of the effect on an extremely old generation, dL(-¥,0)º [(a+b)wA]
-1A ˜(0),
and the effect on a newborn, dL(0,0)º[(a+b)wH]
-1H ˜(0):
The interpretation of (4.2) is straightforward. Extremely old generations possess a large amount of
(4.2) dL(v,0) 1 e
(r a)v dL( ¥,0) e
(r a)vdL(0,0), v£0.
financial assets so that what happens to their human wealth does not matter in the limit. Hence, the
welfare effect on these generations consists of only the capital-gain effect on their financial wealth.
Equation (3.14) thus ensures that extremely old generations gain as a result of the increase in
public investment, i.e. dL(-¥,0)>0.
The welfare effect on newly-born generations at the time of the shock, dL(0,0), is fully
explained by the impact effect on human wealth as this is the only kind of wealth these
generations possess. Since the sign of the impact effect on human wealth is ambiguous (see section
3.2), the same holds for the wealth effect on newly-born generations. As was explained above, if
h>wG and the birth rate is not too high, H ˜(0) is positive and the newly-born (like the extremely
old) gain from the boost to public investment, i.e. dL(0,0)>0 in that case. In the next section it is
shown with some numerical simulations that this result can be easily reversed however.
It is thus in principle possible that all existing generations gain as a result of the public
investment boost. This prompts the question about which generations gain the most. It turns out
that no unambiguous conclusion emerges from the model. If dL(-¥,0)>dL(0,0), the welfare effect
on existing generations is monotonically increasing in age, i.e. ¶dL(v,0)/¶v<0, and the extremely
old generations gain the most. The reverse conclusion holds if dL(-¥,0)<dL(0,0).
Future generations are born in a world that is different from the initial steady state as a
result of the shock. The change in welfare that future generations experience is evaluated at birth,
i.e. the relevant indicator is dL(t,t) for v=t³0. It is shown in Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) that this
welfare indicator is proportional to the path for human wealth:
-15-We have already demonstrated (in section 3.2) that human wealth rises monotonically over time, so
(4.3) (a b)dL(t,t) ˜ H(t)/wH, t v³0.
that the same holds for the welfare effect on future generations, i.e. ¶dL(t,t)/¶t>0. This also implies
that steady-state generations are better off than newly-born generations, i.e. dL(¥,¥)> dL(0,0).
Furthermore, in view of the first expression in (3.13), steady-state generations are better off in
absolute terms, dL(¥,¥)>0, if public capital is relatively scarce, h>wG.
The main characteristics of the path of (the change of) utility have been summarised in
Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3. Let h>0. The solution paths for utility given in (4.2) and (4.3) satisfy the following
properties: (i) Old existing generations experience a welfare gain, i.e., dL(-¥,0)>0; (ii) Steady-
state generations gain more than newborns, dL(0,0)<dL(¥,¥).; (iii) Steady-state generations gain
(lose) in absolute terms if h>wG (h<wG). PROOF: See text.
4.2. Some numerical simulations
We now further illustrate the welfare properties of the model with the aid of some numerical
simulations. The objective is to study the effects on the intergenerational welfare distribution of the
initial share of government investment (wG), the efficiency of public capital (as parameterized by
h), the substitution elasticity of labour supply (sL), the degree of capital mobility (as summarized
by sA), and the degree of durability of public capital (as summarized by dG). The model is
calibrated in such a way that these parameters can be freely varied. The parameters that are held
fixed throughout the simulations are the rate of pure time preference (a=0.02), the foreign interest
rate (r=0.05), the depreciation rate on private capital (d=0.1), the share of labour income (eL=0.7),
and the national income share of consumption (wC=0.7). The birth rate (b) is used as a calibration
parameter. For given values of wG, h, sL, sA and dG, it is then possible to compute all relevant
remaining information.
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Table 3 presents a number of welfare indicators for different values of wG along the
columns. Panel (a) of Table 3 is devoted to investigating the effect of the efficiency parameter h
on the distribution of welfare, whilst panels (b) through (d) do the same for sA, dG, and sL,
respectively. Since the production function is Cobb-Douglas (see (T1.8)) all production factors are
essential, and wG must thus be strictly positive for the model to yield a meaningful solution.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from Table 3, panel (a). First, and rather obviously,
if public capital is completely unproductive (h=0), then no generations gain from an introduction
-16-(or further increase in the level) of public investment. Indeed, as the column for h=0 reveals, only
extremely old generations are unaffected by the shock, i.e. dL(-¥,0)=0. There is no effect on
Tobin’s q (see (3.3)) and thus no capital gain either in that case (see (3.14)). Newborns and all
future generations lose out by the same amount, i.e. dL(t,t)<0 and ¶dL(t,t)/¶t=0 for all t³0. The
shock does not give rise to transitional dynamics in the economy, and all these generations are
affected equally by the once-off decline in the value of their human wealth which is caused by the
increase in the lump-sum tax needed to pay for the additional public investment.
The more interesting cases are of course those associated with strictly positive values for
h. Table 3 demonstrates that the intergenerational distribution of welfare is very uneven. Consider
first the case with wG=0.01 and h=0.1 (scarce productive public capital) in the second column. All
generations gain if more public capital is put in place. Steady-state generations gain the most,
followed by newly-born agents. Hence, dL(¥,¥)>dL(0,0)>dL(-¥,0) and ¶dL(v,0)/¶v>0. This
pattern is preserved for all values of h considered if wG=0.01.
If there is more pre-existing public capital (wG³0.05), the pattern changes because capital
gains on financial assets start to dominate the human wealth effect so that dL(0,0)<dL(-¥,0) and
¶dL(v,0)/¶v<0. Throughout Table 3(a), the identity of the best-off generations depends on the sign
of h-wG.I fh < w G then the best-off generations are those born in the new steady state, i.e.
dL(¥,¥)>dL(-¥,0). The reverse holds if public capital is relatively abundant, i.e. if wG>h.
Another important feature of the simulation results is that the golden-rule solution for
public investment that is implied by the model, i.e. wG=h, is not Pareto optimal as it ignores the
generational distributional effects. Indeed, wG=h is only optimal for steady-state generations.
Extremely old generations still benefit from a further expansion of public investment, whilst new-
born generations lose out. We shall return to this issue in the next section.
The simulations discussed so far demonstrate that, for a wide range of values of h and wG,
very old generations gain and very young generations lose as a result of an increase in the level of
public investment. But how does the policy shock affect the population alive at the time of the
shock? In order to answer that question we compute s(%), which represents the percentage of the
population (alive at the time of the shock) which is no worse-off as a result of the policy shock. In
view of equation (4.2), s(%) can be written as:
where W is defined as:
(4.4) s(%) º
W if dL( ¥,0) > 0 > dL(0,0)
100 if dL( ¥,0) > 0 and dL(0,0) > 0.











in the level of public investment. Indeed, if s(%) exceeds fifty percent one would expect the
existing population to vote in favour of increasing public investment.
The information in panel (a) of Table 3 suggests that the degree of political support
increases with the efficiency parameter h. For example, if wG=0.1 initially, political support is
below fifty percent for h£0.2 but is above fifty percent for h³0.3. This shows that, provided public
capital is sufficiently productive, further increases in public investment can occur under majority
rule despite the uneven intergenerational welfare burden associated with such a measure.
In panel (b) of Table 3 the effect of sA on the intergenerational welfare distribution is
studied. As was pointed out by Bovenberg (1993, p. 13), sA measures the degree of physical
capital mobility; the lower is sA, the lower is the degree of concavity of the adjustment cost
function, and the higher is the mobility of physical capital. As sA®0, there are no adjustment
costs, physical capital is perfectly mobile internationally, and Proposition 1(iii) suggests that hI®¥.
See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 98). The main conclusion which emerges from these
simulation results refers to the welfare effect on extremely old generations. For all cases considered
in Table 3(b), dL(-¥,0) is increasing in sA, i.e. decreasing in the degree of physical capital
mobility. The intuition behind this result is as follows. With a high degree of capital mobility,
installed and new capital goods are close substitutes. As a result, a boost in public investment only
gives rise to a small change in Tobin’s q (see (3.3)), and hence a small capital gain on financial
assets (see (3.14)). Overall, the results of panel (b) are very similar in qualitative terms to those
reported in panel (a).
In panel (c) of Table 3, the effect of the intratemporal labour supply elasticity (sL)o nt h e
intergenerational distribution is studied. Note that the first column reports the case with exogenous
labour supply (sL=0). The results are qualitatively very similar to those for the benchmark case
reported in the third column. Even though the welfare effects on different generations depend in
absolute terms on the labour supply elasticity, the welfare ranking across generations is not
affected. This confirms that the results reported in panel (a) are not very sensitive to the assumed
labour supply elasticity.
In panel (d) of Table 3 the effect of the degree of durability of public capital, dG,i s
investigated. The benchmark case (dG=0.05) is reported in the third column. The degree of
durability of public capital has an important effect on the welfare change for newly-born
generations. Indeed, panel (d) suggests that dL(0,0) is increasing in dG. The intuition is as follows.
-18-If dG is low, public capital is very durable, and a given public investment shock only slowly leads
to an increase in the stock of public capital. As a result, labour productivity and before-tax wages
are only slowly affected by the policy shock. Since the path of lump-sum taxes is unaffected, the
path of after-tax wages lies below the benchmark path, so that the impact effect on human wealth
and welfare is smaller. Indeed, for wG=0.01 and dG=0.01, newly-born generations are worse off as
a result of the boost in public investment. The qualitative picture that emerges from panel (d) is,
however, similar to that from panel (a).
4.3. Intergenerational redistribution
In the previous sub-section it has been demonstrated that the welfare effect of a supposedly
efficiency-improving' policy measure is generation-dependent, and may be very uneven across
generations. This finding demonstrates the need for a mechanism aimed at equalizing the
distribution of welfare over generations. In many of the simulations reported in Table 3,
generations born close to the time of the shock lose out. These generations cannot capture the full
benefits of public investment, as some of these benefits spill over to old existing generations in the
form of capital gains on their financial assets, and to future generations in the form of higher full
income. Young existing generations have no or little financial assets and thus do not capture a
large capital gain, whilst future generations born soon after the shock do not yet benefit from the
higher wages because it takes time for the public and private capital stocks to be increased.
In this section we endow the policy maker with the ability to use bond policy in order to
neutralize the intergenerational welfare effects. In doing so the pure efficiency effects' of public
investment are brought to the fore. We assume that the policy maker is able to choose a path of
debt that is parameterized as follows:
with xj>0 (j=1,2) and bi all finite (i=0,1,2), so that the bond path is stable and converges in the
(4.6) ˜ B(t) b0 b1e
x1t b2e
x2t,
long run to B ˜(¥)=b0. By choosing the policy parameters (xj and bi) appropriately, the policy maker
can smooth the intergenerational welfare distribution.
We focus on an egalitarian policy, according to which the policy maker engineers the bond
path in such a way that all generations share a common gain p (or loss, if p is negative), i.e.
dL(v,0)=dL(t,t)=p for v£0 and t³0. By thus spreading the benefits equally over all generations, p
can be interpreted as the pure efficiency gain of the public investment boost.
9
In order to get all existing generations to be affected equally, dL(v,0)=p, the generation-
specific term appearing in (4.1) must be eliminated. This is done by levying a once-off tax, tK,o n
-19-the owners of the capital stock. It is shown in Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) that the suitable tax
equals:
where q ˜(0) is given in (3.3) above. To the extent that the capital gain on financial assets exceeds
(4.7) tK ˜ q(0) (a b)p,
the common (flow) gain to all generations, the policy maker must levy a once-off tax on capital
owners to equalize the welfare profile for existing generations. The revenue of this once-off levy
gives rise to a discrete adjustment in the level of public debt at impact:
All future generations are affected equally by the policy shock, dL(t,t)=p, provided the
(4.8) ˜ B(0) º b0 b1 b2 wAtK.
path of human wealth is smoothed (see (4.3)). This requires that the path for bonds and thus lump-
sum taxes is set in such a way that all transitional dynamics is eliminated from the path of full
income. It is shown in Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) that this requires the following settings for the
policy parameters:
10
where z0, zH, and zG are constants:
(4.9)



































The intuition behind (4.9) is straightforward. As was pointed out above, the path of full income
(4.10) z0 ºh / e L , z Hº
hdG(1 sL)(1 eL)(r dG)
eL 1 sL(1 eL)( r I d G )(dG hI)
, zG º (z0 zH).
contains dynamic effects due to adjustment in the private capital stock (which occurs at the
adjustment speed hI) and due to the accumulation of public capital (the speed of which is dG). In
order to smooth full income the path of debt (and lump-sum taxes) must contain both exponential
adjustment speeds.
11 The parameters b1 and b2 ensure that the exponential terms receive the
correct weight.
The common welfare gain implied by (4.7)-(4.10) can be written as follows:












-20-where wXºX/Y is the initial full consumption share in output. The sign of the common gain is fully
determined by the term in square brackets on the right-hand side. If public capital is relative scarce
(wG small), this term is positive and all generations can be made better off by increasing the level
of public investment. This conclusion is confirmed numerically in Table 3, which reports values
for p as the first entry in each cell.
An interesting conclusion that emerges from Table 3 is that the prudent use of debt policy
indeed undoes society’s bias towards the provision of too little public capital by spreading the
costs and benefits equally over all generations. Take, for example, the last column in panel (a) of
Table 3. The efficiency of public capital is high, h=0.4, and present generations gain sufficiently to
vote in favour of further public investment for wG£0.1. There is insufficient support to push the
public investment share to wG=0.15, however, as only 36.4 percent of the population would end up
better off as a result. With an egalitarian policy, however, the common gain to all generations is in
fact positive for wG=0.15, i.e. p=2.178, suggesting that the level of public investment should be
higher than wG=0.1. By internalizing the intergenerational external effect by means of bond policy,
the egalitarian policy leads to a more ambitious policy stance regarding public infrastructure.
The optimal egalitarian policy, wG
*, fully internalizes the intergenerational externalities. By
setting wG such that all present and future generations are unaffected by a marginal increase in the
level of public investment (i.e. p=0), the expression for the optimal public investment share is
obtained from equation (4.11):





and demonstrates the crucial interaction between the efficiency of public capital (as parameterized
by h), the degree of durability of public capital (as regulated by dG), and the world interest rate (r).
With non-durable public capital (dG®¥), (4.12) collapses to the golden rule result, i.e. wG
*=h (see
above). With durable public capital, on the other hand, the golden rule is modified by taking into
account the societal costs associated with installing the stock of public capital. These costs are
affected by both the degree of durability of public capital and by the rate of interest. Note finally






This paper could be usefully extended in a number of directions. First, in the present paper all
production factors including public capital enter the production function with a substitution
elasticity of unity. This yields convenient simplifications but may be untenable from an empirical
point of view. A richer pattern of substitution possibilities would potentially reverse some of our
conclusions regarding the macroeconomic and distributional effects of public investment. Second,
in this paper we have restricted attention to the case where lump-sum taxes and bonds constitute
the only governmental financing instruments. Though this is a useful simplification and allows us
to focus on efficiency and distribution in the cleanest possible setting, it is too restrictive as very
few non-distorting taxes appear to be available in actual economies. In this context, a fruitful
extension to our analysis would make use of labour-income taxation as a means of financing the
public infrastructural investments. We hope to return to these issues in future research.
-22-Appendix
The Jacobian matrix on the right-hand side of (2.15) is denoted by DI with typical element di
I
j. Its
characteristic polynomial is given by:
which has distinct roots -hI<0 and rI=r+hI>0. By noting pI(-hI)=0 and implicitly differentiating





A 1 sL(1 eL)
,
(A.1) with respect to hI and sA we obtain:







to sA as stated in Proposition 1.
The Jacobian matrix on the right-hand side of (2.16) is denoted by DS with typical element
di
S
j and its characteristic polynomial is:
which has distinct roots -hS=r-(a+b) and rS=r+b. Since r>a follows from our earlier discussion
(A.3) pS(x) r (a b) x (r b x),
surrounding (2.8), stability for the saving system holds if r<a+b or, equivalently, if wX>wA. The
stability condition thus holds provided the share of government spending in national income is not
too high. This follows from the fact that (wX-wA) equals eL/(1+sL)-wG which is positive provided wG
is not too large (see the information on shares at the bottom of Table 2).
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-25-Footnotes
1. For a comprehensive review of this literature see Gramlich (1994).
2. See for example Aschauer (1988), Aschauer and Greenwood (1985), Barro (1981, 1990),
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) and Turnovsky (1996).
3. Exceptions are formed by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Van de Ven (1996).
4. This not only simplifies the analysis substantially but also appears to be more empirically
relevant. Indeed, to the present day, the empirical literature has not been able to
demonstrate a strong intertemporal substitution effect in labour supply. See Card (1994) for
an assessment.






which satisfies T>0 for tÎ(0,¥), T=0 for t=0 and as t®¥, dT/dt>(=,<)0 for
t<(=,>)t ˆºlog(hI/dG)/(hI-dG), dT/dt=0 as t®¥, dT/dt=1 for t=0, and d
2T/dt
2=0 for t=2t ˆ.I fh I
happens to equal dG, the term becomes:
T(hI,hI,t) º te
hIt,
which has the same properties.





This proves that the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (3.10) is non-
negative.
7. The same results hold if b/dG is varied instead of b/hI. A relatively high value for dG
implies that full income rises rapidly towards its steady-state value.
8. Specifically, wI=1-wC-wG and wA=wC+wG-eL.
9. This egalitarian policy approach is not unlike the one adopted by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987, p. 56). They use the construct of a Lump Sum Redistribution Agency to compute
efficiency gains in a numerical overlapping generations model.
10. In deriving (4.9)-(4.10), we have also incorporated the restrictions implied by (4.7)-(4.8).
11. In Heijdra and Meijdam (1997) we demonstrate the case for which the two adjustment
speeds coincide (dG=hI).
-26-Table 1: Short-run version of the model
(T4.1) ˙ A(t) (r a b)A(t) (a b)H(t) YF(t)
(T4.2) ˙ H(t) (r b)H(t) YF(t)













































(T4.9) YF(t) (1 sL)
1W(t)
(1 sL) T(t)







(T4.12) A(t) q(t)K(t) B(t) F(t)
(T4.13) ˙ KG(t) IG(t) dGKG(t).
-27-Table 2: Log-linearized version of the model
(T2.1) ˜ A
.
(t) (r a b) ˜ A(t) (a b) ˜ H(t) r ˜ YF(t)
(T2.2) ˜ H
.
(t) (r b) ˜ H(t) r ˜ YF(t)
(T2.3) ˜ K
.




(t) r˜ q(t) r(w A w I)/wA ˜ Y(t) ˜ K(t)
(T2.5) ˜ Y(t) ˜ L(t) ˜ W(t)
(T2.6) ˜ L(t) sL ˜ W(t)
(T2.7) ˜ q(t) sA ˜ I(t) ˜ K(t)
(T2.8) ˜ Y(t) eL ˜ L(t) (1 eL) ˜ K(t) h ˜ KG(t)
(T2.9) ˜ YF(t) eL ˜ W(t) ˜ T(t)
(T2.10) wC ˜ C(t) wX ˜ X(t) sL ˜ YF(t) ˜ T(t), w X˜ X ( t ) ( a b )/r ˜ A(t) ˜ H(t)
(T2.11) ˜ B(0) r {˜ T,r} wG {˜ IG,r}




(t) dG ˜ IG(t) ˜ KG(t)
Shares:
wI I/Y Share of firm investment in national income.
wX X/Y Share of full consumption in national income.
wA rA/Y=rqK/Y Share of asset income in national income.
wC C/Y Share of consumption in national income.






Notes: (a) We have used the normalization B=F=0 initially.
(b) sAº-(I/K)(F²/F¢)³0, represents the degree of concavity of the installation cost
function. A low value for sA implies that physical capital is highly mobile, with the
limiting case of sA=0 (no adjustment costs) representing perfect mobility of capital.
-29-Table 3. The efficiency and intergenerational distribution
effects of public investment
Panel (a): The effect of h





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.03, r=0.05, sL=1.0, d=0.1, dG=0.05, eL=0.70, wC=0.7, and sA=0.5. s(%) is the percentage of
the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a marginal increase in the level of
public investment. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy is given by p.Panel (b): The effect of sA





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.03, r=0.05, sL=1.0, d=0.1, dG=0.05, eL=0.70, wC=0.7, and h=0.2. s(%) is the percentage of
the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a marginal increase in the level of
public investment. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy is given by p.Panel (c): The effect of sL




































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.03, r=0.05, d=0.1, dG=0.05, eL=0.70, wC=0.7, sA=0.5, and h=0.2. s(%) is the percentage of
the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a marginal increase in the level of
public investment. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy is given by p. For some
combinations of wG and sL the calibration results in a negative value for wH which renders the saving system unstable.
-32-Panel (d): The effect of dG





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.03, r=0.05, d=0.1, sL=1, eL=0.70, wC=0.7, sA=0.5, and h=0.2. s(%) is the percentage of the
population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a marginal increase in the level of public
investment. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy is given by p.
-33-